

**Amendment 1****Mick Wallace**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Report****A9-0207/2022****Fabio Massimo Castaldo**The EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa  
(2021/2206(INI))**Proposal for a recommendation****Recital D***Proposal for a recommendation**Amendment*

D. whereas the overall stability of the Horn of Africa has further deteriorated since the start of the conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region in November 2020, and is jeopardised by difficult political transitions ongoing in a number of countries; whereas ***despite remaining very brutal***, the conflict in Ethiopia has ***now entered a different phase with a window of opportunity for a negotiated solution; whereas the humanitarian situation remains dramatic; whereas a*** humanitarian truce was announced by the federal government on 24 February 2022 in order to facilitate the provision of aid to Tigray, which ***has*** been cut off by the conflict; whereas the construction and second filling phase of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam built by Ethiopia upstream from the Nile is increasing tensions between Ethiopia and its neighbouring countries;

D. whereas the overall stability of the Horn of Africa has further deteriorated since the start of the conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region in November 2020, and is jeopardised by difficult political transitions ongoing in a number of countries; whereas the conflict in Ethiopia has ***reignited, ending the*** humanitarian truce announced by the federal government on 24 February 2022 in order to facilitate the provision of aid to Tigray, which ***had*** been cut off by the conflict; ***whereas for Tigray's seven million people, the fighting further compounds the dire humanitarian situation caused by the war, the siege and the ensuing food and health crisis which has killed up to half a million people since the war began in November 2020;*** whereas the construction and second filling phase of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam built by Ethiopia upstream from the Nile is increasing tensions between Ethiopia and its neighbouring countries;

Or. en

28.9.2022

A9-0207/2

## Amendment 2

**Mick Wallace**

on behalf of The Left Group

## Report

**Fabio Massimo Castaldo**

The EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa  
(2021/2206(INI))

A9-0207/2022

## Proposal for a recommendation

### Recital G

#### *Proposal for a recommendation*

G. whereas the humanitarian situation in South Sudan is deteriorating as a result of tensions and conflicts, local inter-communal violence and recurrent floods; whereas the UN estimated that Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya needed urgent humanitarian assistance of USD 4.4 billion in 2022 in order to reach 29.1 million people; whereas as of April 2022, only 5 % of those needs had been met by the international community; whereas the drought has already caused the deaths of some 3 million livestock animals across southern Ethiopia and in the arid regions in Kenya, and around 30 % of households' herds have died in Somalia; whereas the locust invasion in East Africa is the worst in 25 years for Ethiopia and Somalia and the worst in 70 years for Kenya and poses a major threat to food security in the region; whereas experts have predicted that more frequent cross-border movements of locusts between Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia will further exacerbate an already precarious food security situation; whereas the disastrous consequences of the war in Ukraine, with food, fuel and commodity prices having now reached unprecedented levels, are exacerbating the serious food crisis in the countries of the Horn of Africa;

#### *Amendment*

G. whereas the humanitarian situation in South Sudan is deteriorating as a result of tensions and conflicts, local inter-communal violence and recurrent floods; whereas the UN estimated that Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya needed urgent humanitarian assistance of USD 4.4 billion in 2022 in order to reach 29.1 million people; whereas as of April 2022, only 5 % of those needs had been met by the international community; whereas the drought has already caused the deaths of some 3 million livestock animals across southern Ethiopia and in the arid regions in Kenya, and around 30 % of households' herds have died in Somalia; whereas the locust invasion in East Africa is the worst in 25 years for Ethiopia and Somalia and the worst in 70 years for Kenya and poses a major threat to food security in the region; ***whereas about 568 000 children were admitted for severe acute malnutrition treatment in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia from January to June 2022, and around 6.5 million children are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition in these three countries; whereas the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group currently estimates that between 23 and 26 million people could face high levels of acute food insecurity by February 2023 due primarily to the drought in the region if the October***

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*to December rains fail;* whereas experts have predicted that more frequent cross-border movements of locusts between Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia will further exacerbate an already precarious food security situation; whereas the disastrous consequences of the war in Ukraine, with food, fuel and commodity prices having now reached unprecedented levels, are exacerbating the serious food crisis in the countries of the Horn of Africa;

Or. en

28.9.2022

A9-0207/3

### **Amendment 3**

**Mick Wallace**

on behalf of The Left Group

### **Report**

**A9-0207/2022**

**Fabio Massimo Castaldo**

The EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa  
(2021/2206(INI))

### **Proposal for a recommendation**

#### **Paragraph 1 - point (i)**

*Proposal for a recommendation*

*Amendment*

(i) ***acknowledge the positive impacts of the commitment shown by the EU and its international partners through missions and operations such as Operation Atalanta, the EU Capacity-Building Mission in Somalia and the EU Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security, both by preventing piracy attacks before they happen and reducing the success rate of those that do, and deplore the failure to renew UN Security Council Resolution 2608, which unfortunately limits the access of the operation to Somali territorial waters; commend the positive results already achieved by the EU Capacity-Building Mission in Somalia in the area of civilian law enforcement, and ensure that the mission has the means and personnel it needs to be effective; call on the Member States to show adequate commitment to ATMIS and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, both in terms of personnel and means, in order to empower the Somali armed forces to enable them to take ownership of security in the country while fully complying with international humanitarian law and international human rights law; underline the need for the EU to confirm its position as a credible partner for Somalia, supporting ATMIS as a part of an integrated approach adopted in***

(i) ***review the tasks and impact of missions and operations such as Operation Atalanta, the EU Capacity-Building Mission in Somalia and the EU Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security in order to ensure they are compliant with human rights; put a plan in place to progressively end all military operations in the region; stop arms transfers to states actively engaged in armed conflicts and repression against their own populations in line with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008<sup>1a</sup>;***

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<sup>1a</sup> OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, p. 99.

*coordination with common security and defence policy missions in Somalia, the European Peace Facility (EPF), humanitarian aid operations and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument;*

Or. en

28.9.2022

A9-0207/4

**Amendment 4**

**Mick Wallace**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Report**

**A9-0207/2022**

**Fabio Massimo Castaldo**

The EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa  
(2021/2206(INI))

**Proposal for a recommendation**

**Paragraph 1 - point (q)**

*Proposal for a recommendation*

*Amendment*

(q) recognise that climate change seriously affects the Horn of Africa, with far-reaching consequences for the stability of the region; scale up common actions in the fight against climate change, in particular in mitigation, adaptation, resilience and disaster risk management; share the benefits of the European Green Deal, enshrined in the European Climate Law, with our partners and support them in adopting their own climate transition agendas by sharing best practices and aligning EU initiatives in this field with existing African initiatives; pay special attention to the human and food security implications of climate change and the need for the EU and its partners to conduct a climate-proof security and defence policy in line with the ambitions of the EU's Climate Change and Defence Roadmap as part of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence; work together with African counterparts in adopting new and innovative ways to fully unleash the region's potential, including by exchanging best practices and adopting new technologies for sustainable agriculture that would empower local entrepreneurship, with the ultimate aim of reducing the dependency on imports of food and agricultural products and stimulating inclusive and sustainable

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economic growth; support the calls of LDCs for the provision of specific financing for losses and damages associated with the adverse effects of climate change and support the reconstruction of the regions affected and their economic revival by adopting additional special measures for the funding of reconstruction and recovery; consider encouraging the Member States to further use targeted debt suspension, relief or cancellation on a case-by-case basis for the most vulnerable LDCs and small island developing states, with the specific purpose of contributing to the fight against climate change as part of a wider international framework;

economic growth; ***recall that land grabbing is not only a major driver of conflict in the region but is also directly linked to the impoverishment and destruction of rural communities and the loss of food sovereignty, and therefore promote binding legislation to prohibit EU-based companies from continuing to promote and benefit from this practice;*** support the calls of LDCs for the provision of specific financing for losses and damages associated with the adverse effects of climate change and support the reconstruction of the regions affected and their economic revival by adopting additional special measures for the funding of reconstruction and recovery; consider encouraging the Member States to further use targeted debt suspension, relief or cancellation on a case-by-case basis for the most vulnerable LDCs and small island developing states, with the specific purpose of contributing to the fight against climate change as part of a wider international framework;

Or. en

**Amendment 5****Mick Wallace**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Report****Fabio Massimo Castaldo**The EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa  
(2021/2206(INI))**A9-0207/2022****Proposal for a recommendation****Paragraph 1 - point (t)***Proposal for a recommendation*

(t) point out that the Horn of Africa is home to some of the main countries of origin, transit and destination for significant migratory flows to other countries in the region as well as the EU; adopt an approach to cooperation on migration that is holistic, conflict-sensitive and context-specific and that puts humans first, in line with *the Khartoum Process*, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the work of the Regional Ministerial Forum on Migration for the East and Horn of Africa, taking into account the different drivers of migration in the region and the persistent vulnerabilities of migrants, upholding the rights of migrants and refugees and recognising the benefits of circular migration and regional mobility in the wider region; *work with the EU's partners to resume the activities of the Khartoum Process to reconfigure it in such a way that reflects the current reality and the various limitations on travel*; develop a long-term partnership that focuses on safe, orderly and regular migration; find a sustainable solution with partner countries in the Horn of Africa to mitigate the consequences of migration towards European external borders; foster enhanced cooperation on border security and the fight against cross-border criminal

*Amendment*

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activities, including human trafficking and illicit trade in weapons and cultural heritage; ensure that all migration cooperation and readmission agreements with the region strictly comply with international human rights and refugee law, in particular the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto;

towards European external borders; foster enhanced cooperation on border security and the fight against cross-border criminal activities, including human trafficking and illicit trade in weapons and cultural heritage; ensure that all migration cooperation and readmission agreements with the region strictly comply with international human rights and refugee law, in particular the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto;

Or. en

28.9.2022

A9-0207/6

## **Amendment 6**

**Mick Wallace**

on behalf of The Left Group

## **Report**

**Fabio Massimo Castaldo**

The EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa  
(2021/2206(INI))

**A9-0207/2022**

## **Proposal for a recommendation**

### **Paragraph 1 - point (x)**

#### *Proposal for a recommendation*

(x) underline their concern regarding the increasingly prevalent and multifaceted influences and rivalries of third parties that do not share the EU's values and objectives in the region, including China and Russia, which are operating with ambitions to promote strictly bilateral interests; recognise that the increasing presence of these actors in the region, particularly in the economic, energy, security – including maritime security – and military spheres, also through propaganda and disinformation campaigns aimed at magnifying the role they are playing there, while undermining the actions of their competitors, including the EU, jeopardises regional peace, European efforts and assistance, and the EU's role as a privileged partner; consider taking all the appropriate action to counter these interferences; promote the EU's support through a holistic approach to the region, fostering economic cooperation and conflict prevention as opposed to the approach of third actors, which is aimed at exacerbating a fragmented environment and escalating geopolitical concerns; take stock of China's consistent and multisectoral investments in the region, while assessing the consequences thereof, including the increased dependency of African states, and addressing China's

#### *Amendment*

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rising presence and influence; call on Turkish authorities to align with EU policies and to better coordinate efforts with EU initiatives, most notably the EU Training Mission in Somalia, in order to be more effective and achieve better outcomes in terms of security and stability, thereby ushering in a swift and genuine democratic transition; strengthen coordination with African counterparts in defining the priority areas to which EU investments should be devoted, and pledge sufficient resources to achieve this; take note of third parties' military build-up in the region, most notably Russia's advanced plans to construct a naval base in the Sudanese coast facing the Red Sea, and the Chinese inauguration of a military base in Djibouti in 2017; pay particular attention to the increasing activities of private security companies, such as the Russian-sponsored Wagner Group, which is operating in Sudan, hampering the democratic transition and exploiting domestic weaknesses at the expense of local populations, in order to avoid the similar negative repercussions witnessed in other regions, and work closely with the AU and the individual countries of the Horn of Africa to create and operationalise an efficient, accountable and reliable national security apparatus in each country; call on all EU Member States to ratify the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries; assess the impact of Russia's war against Ukraine on EU influence in the region;

rising presence and influence; call on Turkish authorities to align with EU policies and to better coordinate efforts with EU initiatives, most notably the EU Training Mission in Somalia, in order to be more effective and achieve better outcomes in terms of security and stability, thereby ushering in a swift and genuine democratic transition; strengthen coordination with African counterparts in defining the priority areas to which EU investments should be devoted, and pledge sufficient resources to achieve this; take note of third parties' military build-up in the region, most notably Russia's advanced plans to construct a naval base in the Sudanese coast facing the Red Sea, and the Chinese inauguration of a military base in Djibouti in 2017; ***underline their concern about the extensive US presence in the region, including through military bases in Djibouti, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, as well as their extensive use of lethal drones; demand a ban on the use of drones for extrajudicial and extraterritorial purposes***; pay particular attention to the increasing activities of private security companies, such as the Russian-sponsored Wagner Group, which is operating in Sudan, hampering the democratic transition and exploiting domestic weaknesses at the expense of local populations, in order to avoid the similar negative repercussions witnessed in other regions, and work closely with the AU and the individual countries of the Horn of Africa to create and operationalise an efficient, accountable and reliable national security apparatus in each country; call on all EU Member States to ratify the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries; assess the impact of Russia's war against Ukraine on EU influence in the region;

Or. en

28.9.2022

A9-0207/7

**Amendment 7**

**Mick Wallace**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Report**

**Fabio Massimo Castaldo**

The EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa  
(2021/2206(INI))

**A9-0207/2022**

**Proposal for a recommendation**

**Paragraph 1 - point (z) - point (iii)**

*Proposal for a recommendation*

(z) (iii) support all diplomatic efforts towards ending the ongoing conflict within Ethiopia, an important player in the Horn of Africa, both at a national level and within the forums provided by the UN and other international partners, in particular the AU and its envoy Olusegun Obasanjo, in order to prioritise agreement on a permanent ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access to all areas and the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean forces, and to facilitate internal reconciliation; insist that the national dialogue recently **launched by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed must** be as inclusive, broad and transparent as possible, including representatives from civil society, in order to fulfil the goal of being a true catalyst for reconciliation; coordinate support between the relevant national and international institutions and the Ethiopian Government in the resumption of health, education and other public facilities and services, including relief services to internally displaced persons and populations affected by conflict; take note of the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch report on crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in Western Tigray; welcome the establishment of an international commission of human rights experts by the UN Human Rights Council

*Amendment*

(z) (iii) support all diplomatic efforts towards ending the ongoing conflict within Ethiopia, an important player in the Horn of Africa, both at a national level and within the forums provided by the UN and other international partners, in particular the AU and its envoy Olusegun Obasanjo, in order to prioritise agreement on a permanent ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access to all areas and the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean forces, and to facilitate internal reconciliation; insist that the national dialogue recently **interrupted by the resumption of full-scale fighting must be restarted and** be as inclusive, broad and transparent as possible, including representatives from civil society, in order to fulfil the goal of being a true catalyst for reconciliation; coordinate support between the relevant national and international institutions and the Ethiopian Government in the resumption of health, education and other public facilities and services, including relief services to internally displaced persons and populations affected by conflict; take note of the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch report on crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in Western Tigray; welcome the establishment of an international commission of human rights

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to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into allegations of violations and abuses committed in Ethiopia since 3 November 2020 by all parties to the conflict; support transitional justice to hold the perpetrators of human rights violations accountable for the serious crimes they have committed in the context of the conflict in Ethiopia, in particular by supporting the role of all institutions involved, such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, the UN Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court; take note of some positive developments in the country, such as the humanitarian truce of 24 March 2022 and the release of some political prisoners; carefully assess the developments in Ethiopia with a view to taking further measures if the situation deteriorates; at the same time, be ready to gradually reinstate budget support and EU assistance if certain conditions are met, inter alia the cessation of hostilities, full and unhindered humanitarian access across Ethiopia, including in the Tigray region, and the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from the country;

experts by the UN Human Rights Council to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into allegations of violations and abuses committed in Ethiopia since 3 November 2020 by all parties to the conflict; support transitional justice to hold the perpetrators of human rights violations accountable for the serious crimes they have committed in the context of the conflict in Ethiopia, in particular by supporting the role of all institutions involved, such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, the UN Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court; take note of some positive developments in the country, such as the *months-long* humanitarian truce of 24 March 2022 and the release of some political prisoners; carefully assess the developments in Ethiopia with a view to taking further measures if the situation deteriorates; at the same time, be ready to gradually reinstate budget support and EU assistance if certain conditions are met, inter alia the cessation of hostilities, full and unhindered humanitarian access across Ethiopia, including in the Tigray region, and the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from the country;

Or. en