

Amendment 11**Maria Arena**

on behalf of the S&D Group

Michael Gahler

on behalf of the PPE Group

Fabio Massimo Castaldo**Report****A9-0207/2022****Fabio Massimo Castaldo**The EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa
(2021/2206(INI))**Proposal for a recommendation****Recital D***Proposal for a recommendation**Amendment*

D. whereas the overall stability of the Horn of Africa has further deteriorated since the start of the conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region in November 2020, and is jeopardised by difficult political transitions ongoing in a number of countries; whereas ***despite remaining very brutal, the conflict in Ethiopia has now entered a different phase with a window of opportunity for a negotiated solution; whereas the*** humanitarian situation remains dramatic; whereas a humanitarian truce was announced by the federal government on 24 ***February*** 2022 in order to facilitate the provision of aid to Tigray, which has been cut off by the conflict; whereas the construction and second filling phase of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam built by Ethiopia ***upstream from the Nile is increasing*** tensions between Ethiopia and its neighbouring countries;

D. whereas the overall stability of the Horn of Africa has further deteriorated since the start of the conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region in November 2020, and is jeopardised by difficult political transitions ongoing in a number of countries; whereas the humanitarian situation ***across Ethiopia*** remains dramatic ***owing to conflict, drought and large-scale internal displacement***; whereas a humanitarian truce was announced by the federal government on 24 ***March*** 2022 in order to facilitate the provision of aid to Tigray, which has been cut off by the conflict; whereas ***hostilities in the northern region of Ethiopia resumed on 24 August 2022; whereas despite remaining very brutal, the conflict in Ethiopia has now entered a different phase, given the public commitment to a negotiated solution under an African Union-led framework made by both parties to the conflict; whereas the*** construction and second filling phase of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam built ***on the upstream Nile*** by Ethiopia ***continues to cause*** tensions between Ethiopia and its neighbouring countries;

Or. en

28.9.2022

A9-0207/12

Amendment 12

Maria Arena

on behalf of the S&D Group

Michael Gahler

on behalf of the PPE Group

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Report

A9-0207/2022

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

The EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa
(2021/2206(INI))

Proposal for a recommendation

Recital F

Proposal for a recommendation

Amendment

F. whereas the first China-Horn of Africa Peace, Governance and Development Conference took place on 20 and 21 June 2022; whereas the Chinese *Ambassador* present at the meeting offered Beijing's unconditional support for the resolution of conflicts in the region, while calling for the countries there to be independent from foreign interference;

F. whereas the first China-Horn of Africa Peace, Governance and Development Conference took place on 20 and 21 June 2022; whereas the Chinese *Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Xue Bing, who was* present at the meeting, offered Beijing's unconditional support for the resolution of conflicts in the region, while calling for the countries there to be independent from foreign interference;

Or. en

28.9.2022

A9-0207/13

Amendment 13

Maria Arena

on behalf of the S&D Group

Michael Gahler

on behalf of the PPE Group

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Report

A9-0207/2022

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

The EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa
(2021/2206(INI))

Proposal for a recommendation

Recital T

Proposal for a recommendation

Amendment

T. whereas the political landscape in Kenya is deeply polarised; whereas general elections ***are due to be*** held on 9 August 2022; whereas the country is struggling economically as a result of the global consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and accumulated debt; whereas Kenya could play a constructive role in regional peace and security; whereas the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy visited Kenya on 29 January 2022 to formally launch the EU-Kenya strategic dialogue, for which the economy, trade and investment have been identified as the key priorities;

T. whereas the political landscape in Kenya is deeply polarised; whereas general elections ***were*** held on 9 August 2022; whereas the country is struggling economically as a result of the global consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and accumulated debt; whereas Kenya could play a constructive role in regional peace and security; whereas the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy visited Kenya ***twice this year, once on 10 September 2022, as part of a regional tour to Kenya, Mozambique and Somalia, and once*** on 29 January 2022 to formally launch the EU-Kenya strategic dialogue, for which the economy, trade and investment have been identified as the key priorities;

Or. en

28.9.2022

A9-0207/14

Amendment 14

Maria Arena

on behalf of the S&D Group

Michael Gahler

on behalf of the PPE Group

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Report

A9-0207/2022

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

The EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa
(2021/2206(INI))

Proposal for a recommendation

Recital V

Proposal for a recommendation

V. whereas President Isaias Afwerki of the People's Front for Democracy and Justice has led Eritrea since its independence in 1993; whereas the democratisation process that *begun* with the adoption of the Eritrean Constitution in 1997 has since stalled; whereas the Eritrean regime has clamped down on most fundamental freedoms and the human rights situation is giving cause for great concern; whereas Eritrea is one of the least developed countries (LDCs); whereas its two principal donors are the Global Fund and the European Commission, with the EU currently channelling EUR 20 million into a road improvement project in Eritrea through the Emergency Trust Fund;

Amendment

V. whereas President Isaias Afwerki of the People's Front for Democracy and Justice has led Eritrea since its independence in 1993; whereas the democratisation process that *began* with the adoption of the Eritrean Constitution in 1997 has since stalled; whereas the Eritrean regime has clamped down on most fundamental freedoms and the human rights situation is giving cause for great concern; whereas Eritrea is one of the least developed countries (LDCs); whereas its two principal donors are the Global Fund and the European Commission, with the EU currently channelling EUR 20 million into a road improvement project in Eritrea through the Emergency Trust Fund, *after having decommitted more than EUR 100 million in 2021 as a result of Eritrea's involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia;*

Or. en

Amendment 15**Maria Arena**

on behalf of the S&D Group

Michael Gahler

on behalf of the PPE Group

Fabio Massimo Castaldo**Report****A9-0207/2022****Fabio Massimo Castaldo**The EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa
(2021/2206(INI))**Proposal for a recommendation****Paragraph 1 – point a***Proposal for a recommendation**Amendment*

(a) undertake a comprehensive evaluation of previous EU strategies and commitments towards the Horn of Africa in order to identify lessons learned and to recalibrate the EU engagement in the region accordingly; recognise that Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has worrying immediate and long-term consequences for the Horn of Africa, and that as a response, the EU must adjust its engagement with the region; respond to the fact that – as a consequence of Russia's illegal action – the overall security situation in the region is negatively affected; address the fact that Russia has already well-established, multifaceted links and influence in the region, including through investments (both civilian and military) and the deployment of paramilitary groups such as the Wagner Group in Sudan, and recognise that these actions have the potential to further destabilise neighbouring areas; counter the Russian attempts to orchestrate misinformation and disinformation campaigns in the region aimed at fomenting anti-EU sentiment by setting up a comprehensive EU public communications strategy to counter and

(a) undertake a comprehensive evaluation of previous EU strategies and commitments towards the Horn of Africa in order to identify lessons learned and to recalibrate the EU engagement in the region accordingly; recognise that Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has worrying immediate and long-term consequences for the Horn of Africa, and that as a response, the EU must adjust its engagement with the region; respond to the fact that – as a consequence of Russia's illegal action – the overall security situation in the region is negatively affected; address the fact that Russia has already well-established, multifaceted links and influence in the region, including through investments (both civilian and military) and the deployment of paramilitary groups such as the Wagner Group in Sudan, and recognise that these actions have the potential to further destabilise neighbouring areas; counter the Russian attempts to orchestrate misinformation and disinformation campaigns in the region aimed at fomenting anti-EU sentiment by setting up a comprehensive EU public communications strategy to counter and

overcome Russian efforts, combined with concrete action and commitments that take into account the needs of the local population; condemn the spread of narratives justifying Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, as exemplified by the Sudanese **President** Hemetti's statement of 23 February 2022, when he falsely claimed that Russia's aggression against Ukraine was to 'protect' Russia; scale up EU diplomatic, political, financial and humanitarian engagement with the AU, its regional components, and individual countries by putting in place concrete action which demonstrates the EU's commitment to the region in order to foster local and regional approaches to prevent further regional instability, reduce their vulnerability to foreign influence, and address and respond to the negative consequences of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine; immediately deepen diplomatic engagement with the governments in the region to discuss and clarify the devastating short, medium and long-term impacts of the Russian objectives and operations in the region; acknowledge that the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the Russian naval blockade, disrupts supply chains and severely impacts the food security of the Horn of Africa, both in the short and medium term, as around 90 % of its wheat is imported from the Russian Federation and Ukraine; take account of the fact that at least 20 million people were already at risk of famine due to unprecedented drought in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia and the locust swarm crisis; significantly scale up EU support and assistance to the Horn of Africa to obviate the risk of famine or difficulties in accessing food; recognise the funding gaps for the region for the next six months, namely USD 437 million according to the World Food Programme and USD 130 million according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and do its utmost to help plug these gaps and go beyond the

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overcome Russian efforts, combined with concrete action and commitments that take into account the needs of the local population; condemn the spread of narratives justifying Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, as exemplified by the Sudanese **General** Hemetti's statement of 23 February 2022, when he falsely claimed that Russia's aggression against Ukraine was to 'protect' Russia; scale up EU diplomatic, political, financial and humanitarian engagement with the AU, its regional components, and individual countries by putting in place concrete action which demonstrates the EU's commitment to the region in order to foster local and regional approaches to prevent further regional instability, reduce their vulnerability to foreign influence, and address and respond to the negative consequences of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine; immediately deepen diplomatic engagement with the governments in the region to discuss and clarify the devastating short, medium and long-term impacts of the Russian objectives and operations in the region; acknowledge that the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the Russian naval blockade, disrupts supply chains and severely impacts the food security of the Horn of Africa, both in the short and medium term, as around 90 % of its wheat is imported from the Russian Federation and Ukraine; take account of the fact that at least 20 million people were already at risk of famine due to unprecedented drought in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia and the locust swarm crisis; significantly scale up EU support and assistance to the Horn of Africa to obviate the risk of famine or difficulties in accessing food; recognise the funding gaps for the region for the next six months, namely USD 437 million according to the World Food Programme and USD 130 million according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and do its utmost to help plug these gaps and go beyond the

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EUR 21.5 million in additional EU humanitarian aid already committed;

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Or. en

28.9.2022

A9-0207/16

Amendment 16

Maria Arena

on behalf of the S&D Group

Michael Gahler

on behalf of the PPE Group

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Report

A9-0207/2022

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

The EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa
(2021/2206(INI))

Proposal for a recommendation

Paragraph 1 – point g

Proposal for a recommendation

(g) address the possible insecurities and tensions arising from Ethiopia's construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the sharing of Nile waters with Sudan and Egypt located downstream; call on the three countries to return to the negotiating table and work with them to find a diplomatically negotiated solution within the appropriate forums under the auspices of the AU and IGAD, taking into account Ethiopia's interest in generating hydropower as well as the concerns of riparian states vis-à-vis water security, and overcoming the risks related to unilateral attitudes towards the use of shared environmental resources; take account of the fact that the effects of climate change pose a major challenge to the Horn of Africa and require the region to cooperate closely in the production of sustainable energy as well as resource sharing, and recognise that the European Green Deal offers important opportunities for cooperation; provide financial and technical assistance as well as share innovative technologies, best practices and lessons learned with our African partners in order to reap the benefits of the green transition, and increase investment in the

Amendment

(g) address the possible insecurities and tensions arising from Ethiopia's construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the sharing of Nile waters with Sudan and Egypt located downstream; call on the three countries to return to the negotiating table and work with them to find a diplomatically negotiated solution within the appropriate forums under the auspices of the AU and IGAD, taking into account Ethiopia's interest in generating hydropower as well as the concerns of riparian states vis-à-vis water security, and overcoming the risks related to unilateral attitudes towards the use of shared environmental resources; take account of the fact that the effects of climate change pose a major challenge to the Horn of Africa and require the region to cooperate closely in the production of sustainable energy as well as resource sharing, and recognise that the European Green Deal offers important opportunities for cooperation; provide financial and technical assistance as well as share innovative technologies, best practices and lessons learned with our African partners in order to reap the benefits of the green transition *and the water-food-energy*

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region's transition, including infrastructure such as transnational energy grids;

nexus, and increase investment in the region's transition, including *integrated* infrastructure such as transnational energy grids;

Or. en

Amendment 17**Maria Arena**

on behalf of the S&D Group

Michael Gahler

on behalf of the PPE Group

Fabio Massimo Castaldo**Report****A9-0207/2022****Fabio Massimo Castaldo**The EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa
(2021/2206(INI))**Proposal for a recommendation****Paragraph 1 – point y***Proposal for a recommendation**Amendment*

(y) reinforce strategic communications through effective and fact-based public information campaigns in order to be more present at a local level and inform about EU actions, objectives and sponsored initiatives in the region to increase the EU's visibility and underline the objective of generating added value for local communities, sustainable development, peace and security and inclusive growth, while also countering disinformation and false narratives from third parties; mandate the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa to focus on regional activities and enhance the EU's visibility, its presence and engagement with all countries in the region to foster closer relations; ensure greater transparency and visibility of the work of the EU Special Representative, **including by publicly reporting on country visits to allow public scrutiny of its actions to ensure** that the EU Special Representative prioritises human rights and democracy support in her engagement with her interlocutors from the region and engages proactively with civil society actors, human rights defenders and voices of dissent, which may be under threat or targeted by the local authorities;

(y) reinforce strategic communications through effective and fact-based public information campaigns in order to be more present at a local level and inform about EU actions, objectives and sponsored initiatives in the region to increase the EU's visibility and underline the objective of generating added value for local communities, sustainable development, peace and security and inclusive growth, while also countering disinformation and false narratives from third parties; mandate the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa to focus on regional activities and enhance the EU's visibility, its presence and engagement with all countries in the region to foster closer relations; ensure greater transparency and visibility of the work of the EU Special Representative, **ensuring** that the EU Special Representative prioritises **conflict resolution**, human rights and democracy support in her engagement with her interlocutors from the region and engages proactively with civil society actors, human rights defenders and voices of dissent, which may be under threat or targeted by the local authorities;

